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the pariS aGreement anD the  
international traDe reGime:  
conSiDerationS For harmonization
Charles E. Di Leva* and Xiaoxin Shi**
I. IntroductIon
The Paris Agreement
1 broadens the international com-
mitment to protect the climate under the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol.2 This commitment is largely 
represented through the Agreement’s requirement that both 
developed and developing countries have shared obligations to 
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.3 As a testament to the 
international community’s commitment, the Agreement entered 
into force ahead of expectations on November 4, 2016.4
The Paris Agreement creates binding obligations on all 
Parties to establish procedures to pursue their nationally deter-
mined course of actions to achieve GHG emission reduction 
targets established through domestic (“bottom-up”) processes, 
rather than globally agreed binding numerical emission reduc-
tion targets in the Kyoto Protocol for “developed countries.”5 
Specifically, the Agreement requires Parties to institute a con-
tinuous planning process to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
impacts, documented in a “nationally determined contribution 
every five years.”6 National emission reduction targets and the 
proposed policy instruments to achieve them are documented 
in the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) or, 
once a country has ratified the Paris Agreement, their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs).7 The Paris Agreement allows 
for adjustments of the emission reduction targets and proposed 
policy instruments.8 These adjustments will emanate from a con-
tinuous national planning process.9 While Parties are expected to 
“maintain successive nationally determined contributions,” they 
can make such adjustments at any time “with a view to enhancing 
[the Party’s] level of ambition”10 to cope with climate change.
Among the 164 INDCs submitted,11 nearly half of the coun-
tries explicitly propose to increase their use of renewable energy 
by providing financial incentives such as a trade-in-tariff systems; 
about one-third of the countries specifically mention improv-
ing industrial processes as a strategy to reduce GHG emissions; 
three countries propose to impose a carbon tax; and two coun-
tries propose to imposing labeling standards and restrictions on 
importation of appliances that are energy inefficient.12 It is our 
view that these types of climate mitigation measures will impact 
global trade to varying degrees. Because of the imminence of the 
implementation of some countries’ measures, there is a resurgence 
of attention to the “trade versus environment” question.13
This paper posits that there is no direct conflict between 
the Paris Agreement and regional or international trade agree-
ments. These trade agreements and their case law, as well as the 
language of the Paris Agreement indicate that fulfilling a state’s 
obligations under the Paris Agreement and acting pursuant to 
their NDCs should not automatically lead to the assumption 
that there is a trade and environment conflict. However, Parties 
need to be cognizant of their trade agreement obligations that are 
fundamental to the protection of free trade and investor expecta-
tions. This paper aims to help understand the space where coun-
tries could implement INDCs and NDCs without violating the 
principles of trade agreements.
II. trAde-relAted InItIAtIves to  
reduce greenhouse gAs (ghg) emIssIons  
post pArIs Agreement
1. the pariS aGreement: manDatory national 
planninG proceSS, non-binDinG GhG emiSSion 
reDuction tarGetS
The Paris Agreement is a procedurally oriented instrument 
that, unlike the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, does not include 
specific regulatory parameters. It requires Parties to imple-
ment a course of actions that lead to a unspecified amount of 
GHG emission reduction, recognizing the need to hold “the 
increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the tempera-
ture increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”14 The Paris 
Agreement requires Parties to, inter alia, institute a continuous 
planning process of determining national GHG emission reduc-
tion targets, as well as mitigation15 and adaptation16 measures. 
Specifically, Parties “shall” communicate the GHG emission 
reduction targets and mitigation measures in “a nationally 
determined contribution every five years”17 and communicate 
adaptation measures “as a component of or in conjunction with 
other communications or documents, including . . . a nationally 
determined contribution.”18 A Party “may at any time adjust its 
existing nationally determined contribution,” 19 making the man-
datory national planning process a continuous one.
Additionally, the Paris Agreement does not prescribe the 
exact content of NDCs. Instead, Parties determine the mitigation 
measures to be undertaken to collectively achieve the tempera-
ture goal of the Paris Agreement. Decision 1/CP.20, part of the 
“Lima Call for Climate Action,” suggests a list of items that a 
NDC should address.20 Paragraph 14 of the Decision provides 
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that INDCs “may include, as appropriate, inter alia,” quantifiable 
information on the reference point, planning processes, time 
periods for implementation, just to name a few.21 Most INDCs 
provide only a nation-wide emission reduction target, accom-
panied by generally defined mitigation strategies. For example, 
Indonesia’s INDC states that it is committed to reduce 26% of 
GHG emission against the business as usual scenario by 202022 
and will reduce emissions through forest conservation, increased 
renewable energy use, as well as improved waste management.23 
Realization of such strategies that are stated only in general 
terms requires further regulatory and/or legislative actions.
Depending on Parties’ ambitions, they may use an exist-
ing legal framework or propose new legislation to reduce GHG 
emissions. For example, South Africa proposes in its NDC to 
develop policy instruments such as a carbon tax, desired emis-
sion reduction outcomes for sectors, and company-level car-
bon budgets to reduce GHG emissions.24 In contrast to South 
Africa, the United States emphasizes in its NDC that the U.S. 
economy-wide GHG emission reduction target is based on an 
examination of the “opportunities under existing regulatory 
authorities.”25 The United States ratified the Paris Agreement 
as an executive agreement without advice and consent from 
the Senate, which had ratified the UNFCCC.26 Such ratifica-
tion process reflects the rationale that the Paris Agreement 
does not legally require the United States to take action 
beyond its obligations under the UNFCCC and, as a Party to 
the UNFCCC, the U.S. Executive Branch has sufficient legal 
authority under existing law for developing and implementing 
necessary mitigation measures to achieve the national com-
mitment.27 Moreover, the Paris Agreement does not provide 
requirements on the substance of INDCs and NDCs that are 
more specific than those in the Decision 1/CP.20, part of the 
“Lima call for climate action.”28 The Agreement provides only 
general requirements that a successive NDC “will represent a 
progression beyond” the Party’s current NDC29 and that the 
NDCs should be “ambitious.”30 As such, the GHG emission 
reduction targets in the NDCs are not considered to be legally 
binding, at least under U.S. law, and Parties have considerable 
flexibility in deciding the actions they would take to contribute 
to the global goal of GHG emission reduction.31 Therefore, 
the Paris Agreement affords Parties considerable flexibility in 
developing NDCs based on national circumstances.
2. poSt pariS aGreement: more ambitiouS national 
actionS to reDuce GhG emiSSionS
The Paris Agreement employs a procedure-based approach 
coupled with a mechanism to help Parties implement their NDCs. 
The consequence of Parties not achieving the claimed GHG emis-
sion reduction targets, however, lacks the type of sanction for 
non-compliance that existed under the Kyoto Protocol.32 As set 
forth in Article 15 of the Paris Agreement, challenges in fulfill-
ing the NDCs are to be dealt with through a “mechanism” that is 
designed “to facilitate implementation and promote compliance” 
(emphasis added).33 The Article 15 mechanism has four elements. 
First, the INDCs and NDCs are public documents.34 Second, a 
technical expert review of the supporting information provided 
by Parties on the implementation and progress of the INDCs and 
NDCs is required.35 Third, the Paris Agreement requires a global 
“stocktake” in 2023 “of collective progress towards achieving the 
purpose of [the Paris] Agreement and its long-term goals” and 
every five years thereafter,36 which provides the basis for Parties 
to adjust their actions.37 Finally, an expert-based committee facili-
tates compliance by taking measures that are “transparent, non-
adversarial and non-punitive.”38 Therefore, although Parties enjoy 
discretion in deciding their emission reduction targets and means 
to achieve these targets, the procedural obligations under the Paris 
Agreement enhance the public exposure of Parties’ commitments 
and hence incentivize compliance by Parties.
As of November 2016, 163 INDCs have been submitted.39 
The emission reduction strategies stated in INDCs typically 
include increasing renewable energy in the energy mix, improv-
ing industrial processes, incentivizing energy efficiency, and 
improving solid waste management.40 Some INDCs present 
more specific policy instruments to reduce GHG emissions.41 
Four types of these policy instruments are of particular relevance 
to the issue of design and implementation that does not violate 
the principles of fair trade under international agreements. We 
explore these principles in the following sections of this paper. 
The first category of instrument is the use of tax and tariff, 
including tax or tax reduction measure based on CO2 emission 
or energy efficiency of the product,42 a tax measure based on the 
energy consumption in the production process such as utilities,43 
a feed-in-tariff to incentivize renewable energy investments,44 
and an import duty on goods that are energy-inefficient such as 
used vehicles.45 The second category is a financial requirement 
on certain investments to contribute funds for climate change 
mitigation.46 The third category is the development of energy 
efficiency standards for appliances.47 The fourth category is the 
use of technical standards for reducing GHG emissions from 
industrial processes.48 These policy instruments are likely to have 
impacts on international trade as they distinguish products based 
on factors that some may contend are not based on the “likeness” 
of a product.49 In addition, at least some countries may proceed 
to quickly lay out the specifics of these policy instruments given 
their declaration of ambitious national commitments under the 
Paris Agreement. Depending on the nature of these relatively 
new policy instruments and the manner in which they are imple-
mented, they might interfere with what some trading partners or 
foreign investors would claim as their “reasonable expectations.” 
The following sections of this paper explore the boundaries on 
climate-related policy instruments under major regional and 
international trade agreements.
III. the InterfAce betWeen the  
pArIs Agreement And InternAtIonAl  
trAde Agreements
This section discusses the interface between the Paris 
Agreement and international trade agreements by examining 
the relevant requirements and cases under the bilateral trade 
agreements, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
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the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. An examination is 
necessary because neither the Paris Agreement nor the 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), under which the Paris Agreement was negoti-
ated, defines such interface explicitly. Instead, both the Paris 
Agreement and the UNFCCC indicate the expectation of harmo-
nious interaction with trade agreements.
Specifically, Article 3 of the UNFCCC provides that in 
achieving its objective, Parties “should cooperate to promote a 
supportive and open international economic system” (emphasis 
added) and “[m]easures taken to combat climate change, includ-
ing unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade” (emphasis added).50 The wording “should” 
suggests that compliance with the UNFCCC provides no cat-
egorical exceptions to the trade restrictions that would otherwise 
be inconsistent with international trade agreements.51 Similarly, 
the preamble of the Paris Agreement states that Parties “[r]
ecogniz[e] that Parties may be affected . . . by the impacts of 
the measures taken in response to [climate change]” and “[e]
mphasiz[e] the intrinsic relationship that climate change actions, 
responses and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable 
development and eradication of poverty.”52 These clauses sug-
gest that Parties need to take into account the potential trade and 
economic implications of climate change mitigation actions and 
examine whether the regulatory actions would violate interna-
tional trade agreements to which they are also Parties.
1. caSeS unDer the north american Free traDe 
aGreement (naFta)
Bilateral and multilateral investment treaties typically afford 
foreign investors the protection against expropriation, unjustifi-
able and arbitrary treatment, and discriminatory treatment com-
pared with other foreign or domestic investors,53 as well as the 
right of private parties to bring a claim against states on these 
substantive rights.54
The interface between these treaties and their Parties’ envi-
ronmental regulations is still largely an issue to be sorted out on 
a case-to-case basis. An OECD survey found that language refer-
ring to environmental concerns is common in multilateral invest-
ment treaties but rare in bilateral investment treaties.55 Among 
the investment treaties that contain language on environmental 
concerns, most of them do so by including general language 
recognizing the issue of environmental protection or reserving 
policy space for environmental regulations.56 The survey found 
only one treaty that explicitly excludes the environmental provi-
sions as a basis for investor-state claims.57
This section discusses case law under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to illustrate the potential 
limitations on environmental regulations due to protection 
of investors’ substantive rights. NAFTA Chapter 11 provides 
five fundamental principles for investor protection: National 
Treatment (Article 1102), Most-Favored-Nation Treatment 
(Article 1103), Minimum Standard of Treatment (Article 
1105), Expropriation and Compensation (Article 1110), and 
Performance Requirements (Article 1106). NAFTA Article 
1106(6) provides exceptions to the environment-related limits 
that Parties can place on, or use to regulate investors58: a party 
may adopt “environmental measures” that, inter alia, are “neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”59 or “nec-
essary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources”60 provided that “such measures are not applied 
in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a dis-
guised restriction on international trade or investment.”61
NAFTA Article 1114 (2) addresses the “leakage” issue. It 
provides that a party “should not waive or otherwise derogate 
from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from [domestic 
health, safety or environmental] measures as an encouragement 
for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in 
territory of an investment” (emphasis added).62 Additionally, 
to strengthen the environmental framework under NAFTA, 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico signed the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, establish-
ing the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to 
advise on and strengthen cooperation to solve potential conflicts 
between environmental protection and investment protection63 
Specifically, under NAAEC Article 10(7), if a party considers 
that the other party’s regulatory action violates NAFTA Article 
1114(2), the CEC “shall” facilitate agreement between disput-
ing parties within three years by providing recommendations on 
assessing the environmental impacts of proposed investment, 
consultation between parties, and mitigation of the adverse envi-
ronmental impacts.64 However, the implementation of NAAEC 
Article 10(7) has been criticized, including by a former CEC 
official, as being unsuccessful.65
Investors’ expectations of operating in a stable legal and 
business environment as protected by trade agreements may well 
be an important consideration when countries proceed in pro-
mulgating ambitious regulations or other measures to achieve the 
emission reduction targets in (I)NDCs. Because the consistency 
of these regulations or other measures with the trade regime’s 
“most-favored-nation treatment” and “national treatment” provi-
sions are discussed in more detail in the context of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,66 the discussion of case law 
under NAFTA focuses on the minimum standard of treatment 
(Article 1105), expropriation and compensation (Article 1110), 
and performance requirements on investors (Article 1106).
1.1 article 1105 MiNiMuM StaNdard oF treatMeNt
NAFTA Article 1105 Minimum Standard of Treatment 
protects investor interests in operating in a stable legal and busi-
ness environment. 67 Importantly, Article 1105 is not a guarantee 
against regulatory change, whether or not the change is mate-
rial.68 Article 1105(1) requires a Party to accord investors of 
another Party “treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security.”69 The Tribunal in Mobil Investments Inc. and Murphy 
Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada held, after referring 
to a line of NAFTA Tribunal cases, that Article 1105(1) prohibits 
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“conduct . . . that is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyn-
cratic, or is discriminatory and exposes [an investor] to sectional 
or racial prejudice, or [lacks] due process leading to an outcome 
which offends judicial propriety — as might be the case with 
a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or 
a complete lack of transparency and candor in any administra-
tive process.”70 To find an Article 1105(1) violation, the Tribunal 
held that there should be clear and explicit representations by the 
state to induce the investment, reasonable reliance by the inves-
tor, and subsequent repudiation by the state.71
Further, a differentiated effect on foreign investors com-
pared with domestic investors, without more, does not lead to a 
finding of Article 1105(1) violation. In Methanex Corporation 
v. United States of America, the Tribunal rejected an Article 
1105(1) claim of a Canadian distributor of methanol that chal-
lenges a California ban on the use or sale in California of the 
gasoline additive MTBE, which is produced from methanol.72 
In its Article 1105(1) claim, Methanex, the Canadian distribu-
tor of methanol, relied on the alleged discriminatory motive of 
the California government for promulgating the ban. Methanex 
argued that the ban was driven by a discriminatory motive to 
protect the U.S. ethanol industry.73 Methanex argued that if the 
ban was truly driven by California’s concern over chemical leak-
ages from underground storage tanks for gasoline,74 California 
would not have banned only one chemical component of gaso-
line, i.e., MTBE, while allowing other chemicals to leak into the 
environment.75 It further argued that instead of banning MTBE, 
California could have sought a remedy to the leaking under-
ground storage tanks at a less cost.76
The Tribunal rejected Methanex’s argument for several rea-
sons. First, Methanex failed to present sufficient evidence at the 
hearing to establish the discriminatory intent of California gov-
ernment.77 Secondly, the Tribunal found that the discriminatory 
intent, even if it was established, is not an element in determining 
Article 1105(1) violation.78 The Tribunal reasoned that Article 
1105(1) does not mention “discrimination” and therefore does not 
preclude differentiated treatment of foreign investors.79 Thirdly, 
the Tribunal held that discrimination alone, without more, does 
not lead to a finding of Article 1105(1) violation.80 Specifically, 
under the holding of Mobil Investments, conduct that violates 
Article 1105(1) should be discriminatory and have exposed the 
claimant to “sectional or racial prejudice.”81 A similar outcome in 
a matter involving renewable energy regulation recently occurred 
in Mesa Power Group, LLC v Canada, where a NAFTA Tribunal 
supported the Government of Canada’s position that Ontario’s 
renewable energy regulation did not constitute a violation of 
the US investor’s expectation under Article 1105.82 Moreover, it 
added that tribunals should give a “good level of deference to the 
manner in which a states regulates its internal affairs.”83
A more recent ruling provided a different outcome for the 
party claiming a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
requirement. In Windstream Energy LLC v. Canada, a NAFTA 
Tribunal found that, while the Government of Ontario had not 
carried out an expropriation, its conduct toward the investment of 
a US wind power company consisted of a violation of the “fair 
and equitable treatment” requirement of Article 1105(1).84 In this 
case, the Tribunal found as “unfair and inequitable” the manner 
in which an application for an offshore wind power facility by a 
U.S. based company was handled by the Government of Ontario, 
in particular, once the Government decided post-application to 
impose a moratorium on offshore wind. The Tribunal faulted the 
government for failing to act in a timely and transparent manner 
in the handling of the application. It held that “the failure of the 
Government of Ontario to take the necessary measures …within a 
reasonable period of time after the imposition of the moratorium 
to bring clarity to the regulatory uncertainty surrounding the sta-
tus and the development of the Project created by the moratorium, 
constitutes a breach of Article 1105(1) of NAFTA.”85
1.2 article 1110 expropriatioN aNd coMpeNSatioN
The manner in which countries implement new regulations 
and the timing of doing so are also key aspects to consider in 
implementing the commitments of INDCs and NDCs without vio-
lating trade agreements. Climate-related regulatory action should 
be cognizant that under Article 1110 of NAFTA, nationalization 
or expropriation of a foreign investment is permissible only when 
doing so is “(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory 
basis; in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); 
and on payment of compensation . . . [that is] equivalent to the fair 
market value of the expropriated investment.”86
The Tribunal in Methanex Corporation v. United States 
of America elaborated the standard of Article 1110. In finding 
that California’s ban of MTBE did not violate Article 1110, the 
Tribunal noted that “as a matter of general international law, a 
non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is 
enacted in accordance with due process . . . is not deemed expro-
priatory and compensatory unless specific commitments had 
been given by the regulating government to the . . . investor con-
templating investment that the government would refrain from 
such regulation.”87 This case suggests that the factors relevant 
to the determination of whether the regulation is non-discrimi-
natory and promulgated with due process include the timeline 
of legislation, whether there was scientific study, whether there 
was a public hearing, participation of stakeholders, and whether 
the complainant investor participated in the legislative process.88
In contrast, the Tribunal in Metalclad Corporation v. The 
United Mexican States found an Article 1110 violation based 
on a regulatory taking that took place after the government 
had made a commitment to allow the investor to proceed with 
the contemplated investment.89 In this case, Mexico issued 
COTERIN federal and state construction and operating permits 
for a proposed landfill.90 Federal officials assured Metalclad 
that no municipal permits were needed for undertaking the 
landfill project.91 In reliance on such government representation, 
Metalclad acquired COTERIN for the sole purpose of develop-
ing and operating a landfill site92 and started construction.93 
Five months later, the municipality ordered the cessation of 
construction due to lack of a municipal construction permit.94 
Federal officials then told Metalclad that a municipal permit 
was necessary and the municipality would issue the permit as a 
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matter of course.95 Metalclad applied for a municipal construc-
tion permit and resumed construction.96 After the landfill was 
constructed and had undergone inauguration, the municipality 
denied Metalclad’s permit application.97 Metalclad submitted 
the NAFTA claim for arbitration.98 Thereafter, the municipality 
issued an Ecological Degree declaring a protected area for rare 
cactus encompassing the landfill site.99
The Metalclad Tribunal first found the conduct of the 
Mexican government violated Article 1105 Minimum Standard 
of Treatment by leading Metalclad to believe that it was fully 
authorized to construct and operate the landfill under the federal 
and state permits;100 by denying Metalclad’s municipal construc-
tion permit application without prior notice of the administra-
tive proceeding and an opportunity to appear;101 by denying the 
construction permit based only on reasons that were unrelated to 
construction or physical aspects of the landfill;102 and by promul-
gating a regulation that effectively and permanently prevented the 
use of Metalclad’s investment.103 The Article 1105 violation, taken 
together with the lack of a “timely, orderly, or substantive basis” 
for the municipality to deny Metalclad’s permit application, was 
found to constitute an indirect expropriation.104 Although there 
appears to be a significant overlap between the Tribunal’s reason-
ing for finding an Article 1110 violation and the reasoning for 
finding an Article 1105 violation, the facts in this case illustrate 
the relevant aggravating factors for finding expropriation.
As indicated in both the Methanex case and the Metalclad 
case, whether the state had the substantive basis for taking the 
regulatory action at issue is relevant in finding Article 1105 and 
Article 1110 violations. Such substantive basis could lie not 
only in existing requirements under domestic law but also in 
the state’s obligation under international treaties. The Chemtura 
Corporation v. Canada case illustrates the latter situation where 
the state’s international obligations negated the finding of unfair 
treatment.105 In the Chemtura case, an American investor chal-
lenged the Canadian government for terminating registrations of 
Chemtura’s products based on findings of a health risk review.106
The Tribunal found the Canadian government agency did 
not act in bad faith by launching a risk review process based 
on two sets of evidence.107 First, the ban of the same product 
in other countries established the existence of the public health 
concerns based on which the Canadian government initiated 
the risk review and termination of registration.108 Second, 
the Canadian government undertook the risk review to fulfill 
its obligation under Annex II of the Aarhus Protocol to the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants, which requires Canada to assess 
the use of such product at issue no later than two years after the 
Protocol entered into force.109 Under this reasoning, the Paris 
Agreement and a state’s commitment in INDCs and NDCs to 
curb GHGs emissions could provide legal grounds for a state’s 
regulatory actions aiming at emission reduction, weighing in 
favor of finding satisfaction of the required treatment of foreign 
investors under NAFTA.
1.3 article 1106 perForMaNce StaNdardS oN iNveStorS
As discussed previously in Section II.2 of this paper, requir-
ing investments in certain sectors to contribute funds for domestic 
climate change mitigation is one of the specific measures proposed 
in some INDCs.110 Unless properly instituted, however, such a 
measure might arguably constitute a prohibited requirement on 
foreign investors to purchase or accord preference to domestic 
goods or services under NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c), which pro-
hibits the state from imposing on “investors of a Party or of a non-
Party” requirements “to purchase, use or accord a preference to 
goods produced or services provided in its territory, or to purchase 
goods or services from persons in its territory.”111
In Mobil Investments Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. 
Government of Canada, the Tribunal found the Canadian gov-
ernment’s regulation inconsistent with NAFTA Article 1106(1)
(c).112 The Canadian government requires offshore petroleum 
projects to contribute a certain percentage of their revenue to 
research and development (“R&D”) and education and training 
(“E&T”) as part of a Benefits Plans that project proponents must 
prepare as a condition for project approval.113 Specifically, the 
R&D and E&T requirement constitutes an obligatory expendi-
ture requirement, although the regulation allows project propo-
nents to decide the specifics of the expenditure modalities in the 
Benefits Plans so long as the regulatory expenditure level for 
R&D and E&T is met.114
The Tribunal found the R&D and E&T expenditure require-
ment constitutes “service” under Article 1106.115 Additionally, 
the R&D and E&T requirement constitutes a “requirement” 
within the meaning of Article 1106 because it is a precondition 
for project approval, as opposed to an incidental effect of the 
regulation with respect to the purchase, use, or accordance of a 
preference to domestic goods or services.116 Finally, the Tribunal 
found that to fulfill this requirement in practice, the project pro-
ponent would unavoidably have to give preference to domestic 
goods or services, even though the regulation does not explicitly 
state so.117
2. caSeS unDer the General aGreement on tariFFS 
anD traDe (Gatt)
At the outset, it is important to note that the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) recognizes the importance of environmental 
protection and sustainable development in the field of international 
trade.118 These mutually supportive concepts were embedded in 
the preamble to the 1994 Agreement Establishing the WTO, which 
states that WTO members recognize “that their relations in the 
field of trade and economic endeavor should . . . allow for the opti-
mal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective 
of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve 
the environment.”119 The Parties to the WTO also established a 
Trade and Environment Committee to, inter alia, help facilitate 
harmonization between these two regimes.120
Our research did not find any WTO case that challenges a 
provision of, or actions taken directly pursuant to a multilateral 
environmental agreement (MEA), despite that there are reported 
to be hundreds of MEAs and at least twenty of them contain 
25Fall 2016
provisions that affect trade.121 These provisions include those 
that addressed trade in endangered species, ozone depleting 
substances, and hazardous wastes.122 However, these measures, 
which are typically product or commodity specific, are unlikely 
to impact the global economy to the same degree as regulations 
and standards based on GHG emissions, which often deal with 
the production process of certain products. Moreover, these 
globally agreed MEA measures are specific, typically defining 
the regulatory scheme that ratifying countries shall incorpo-
rate into national law.123 In contrast, the Paris Agreement is a 
procedure-based instrument that lets Parties choose their own 
means for achieving their climate friendly ambitions, rather than 
tackling directly the issue of compatibility between international 
environmental standards and trade treaties. As such, it is impor-
tant to address some key provisions in WTO agreements that the 
Parties taking action under the Paris Agreement may need to 
keep in mind.124
The non-discrimination principle of the GATT prohibits dis-
crimination between “like products” based on their countries of 
origin. Specifically, under Article I, all “like products” from for-
eign countries shall be given “most-favored-nation treatment.”125 
Under Article III, products from foreign countries shall be given 
“no less favorable” treatment than domestic “like products” under 
“all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”126
2.1 article i MoSt-Favored-NatioN treatMeNt
In general, border measures are likely to violate the “most-
favored-nation treatment” requirement under Article I to the 
extent that they are activated based upon the country of origin of 
the products.127 In this context, because the international com-
munity has not established a uniform trade measure such as a 
global carbon tax, as it did, for example, with the possibility of 
trade sanctions under the Montreal Protocol, one might envision 
a GATT challenge if an importing country were to levy a tax on 
imported products measured by the amount of GHG emissions 
or energy consumed in the production process.128 Article I may 
well countenance a scheme whereby an importing country estab-
lishes a tax scheme on imported goods that reflects the carbon 
taxes that their own “like products” are subject to in the coun-
tries of origin of the imported goods, if any.129 Alternatively, 
the importing country could apply the same tax on all “like 
products” regardless of the exporting country and request the 
exporting countries to rebate to their exporters the GHG-related 
tax paid to the importing country.130 In case the exporting coun-
try refuses to do so, the exporters would face a different tax on 
products from that country and therefore violation of Article I 
appears inevitable.
A similar issue might arise where an importing country 
would impose a higher tax or tariff on automobiles that release 
or consumed higher amounts of GHGs in their manufacture. 
The scheme would have to be tested on whether the products 
are “like products” given their different GHG emissions in the 
production process. Early GATT cases indicate that likeness 
is found based on product characteristics, end uses, consumer 
preferences, and tariff classification.131 The process and produc-
tion methods (PPMs) of the product, such as the GHG emissions 
during production of the automobile, do not necessarily affect 
these factors that influence the finding of “likeness.” It is noted 
that, however, the amount of GHG emissions during production 
process might affect the “consumer preference” factor in the 
likeness determination.
For the environmental community, such WTO case rulings 
raise the concern that trade measures could not be based solely 
upon the GHG emissions in the production process without 
violating Article I, unless the GHG emissions correlates with 
the physical characteristics of the final product. However, even 
if there is an Article I violation due to differentiated treatment 
among “like” automobiles, such treatment might be justified 
under Article XX exceptions (b) and (g), which are discussed 
further in later sections.132
2.2. article iii NatioNal treatMeNt
Article III applies to internal measures, such as a GHG-
related tax or an energy-efficiency standard on certain products. 
Article III:2 requires that imported products shall not be subject 
to internal taxes in excess of those applied to like domestic prod-
ucts.133 The Appellate Body held in Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages that to find a violation of Article III, there should 
not only be a finding that directly competitive or substitutable 
products are not similarly taxed, but also the dissimilar taxation 
“must be more than de minimis.”134
Article III:4 requires imported products be provided no 
less favorable treatment as “like” domestic products.135 The 
Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program case 
provides an example where a facially neutral feed-in tariff (FIT) 
program was found to have violated Article III:4 for tying the 
program’s benefits with the requirement of using domestic con-
tent in energy production, even though participation in the FIT 
program is made based on contracts between the government and 
private entities.136 The FIT Program was implemented in 2009 to 
increase the mix of electricity from certain renewable sources in 
the Ontario electricity system.137 Generators participating in the 
FIT Program are paid a guaranteed price under twenty-year or 
forty-year contracts with the government.138 In addition, when 
building solar or wind power electricity generation facilities 
with production capacity of more than 10kW, the generator 
must ensure that the facilities satisfy the “Minimum Required 
Domestic Content Level”; a requirement on the purchase or use 
of products of Canadian origin or from a Canadian source.139 In 
other words, compliance with the “Minimum Required Domestic 
Content Level” is a prerequisite for generators using solar PV 
and wind power to participate in the FIT Program and thereby 
benefit under the FIT Program.140
“No less favorable” treatment, however, does not require 
identical treatment.141 The Appellate Body held in European 
Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products that the mere existence of distinctions in 
treating like products does not necessarily lead to a finding of less 
favorable treatment.142 Such differentiated treatment is potentially 
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permissible under Article III:4 if the differentiation is based on 
factors other than country of origin, such as market share of the 
importer.143 Importantly, the “less favorable treatment” determina-
tion is made based on an individual case of the imported products. 
In this determination, the argument that the regulatory program at 
issue is generally non-discriminatory by “balancing more favor-
able treatment of some imported products against less favorable 
treatment of other products” is irrelevant.144
A frequently contested issue in finding Article III violation 
is the “likeness” of products. Relevant factors in the determi-
nation of likeness include: the products’ end-uses in a given 
market, consumers’ tastes and habits, the product’s properties, 
nature and quality, tariff classification,145 and the existence of 
competitive relationship between the products in the market-
place.146 This is not an exhaustive list because the Appellate 
Body expressly refrained from defining the “precise scope of 
the word ‘like.’”147 Restrictions on products based on their 
production process might be upheld under Article III to the 
extent that such restrictions go to the physical characteristics 
and market competitiveness of the product.148
2.3 article xx exceptioNS For  
eNviroNMeNtal protectioN
2.3.1 Article XX chapeau: prohibition of arbitrary  
or unjustifiable discrimination and disguised  
trade restriction
As is demonstrated by our discussion below, an important 
GATT provision that can underpin trade and environmental 
harmonization is that regulations that would otherwise violate 
the non-discrimination principles set out in GATT, including 
Articles I and III, could be justified under GATT’s Article XX 
exceptions. The chapeau of Article XX stipulates that the regu-
latory actions justified under the exceptions under Article XX 
shall not be “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail” or “a disguised 
restriction on international trade.”149 In determining whether a 
regulatory action meets these requirements, the Appellate Body 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) considers (i) whether 
less discriminatory courses of action are available;150 (ii) whether 
the regulating country made good faith effort to negotiate on a 
continuous basis with all affected trading partners before impos-
ing trade restrictions, even if no agreement was reached;151 (iii) 
whether the same factors are examined in designing restrictions 
on foreign products and in designing restrictions on domestic 
products;152 (iv) and whether the regulation takes into account 
different conditions in trading partner countries and when neces-
sary, maintains some flexibility given such differences.153 The 
party invoking the exceptions under Article XX bears the burden 
of demonstrating that the challenged regulatory action, in its 
application, is consistent with the chapeau.154
In United States–Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, Brazil and Venezuela successfully 
challenged a U.S. regulation for being inconsistent with Article 
III:4 on national treatment155 and unjustifiable under Article XX 
exceptions.156 The challenged regulation, promulgated as part of 
the gasoline program under the Clean Air Act, required conven-
tional gasoline sold by domestic refiners, blenders, and importers 
in the United States to be as clean as 1990 baseline levels.157 The 
1990 baselines can be individually established based on actual 
1990 data of the regulated entity or statutorily established by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) based on the aver-
age gasoline quality in the United States in 1990.158 Refiners of 
domestically produced gasoline are required to establish individ-
ual baselines calculated based on the methodology provided by 
the EPA unless actual 1990 data are unavailable.159 About 97% 
of U.S. refiners established individual baselines.160 Importers 
of gasoline are instead required to apply the statutory baseline, 
except in the rare case that they could establish an individual 
baseline.161 The U.S. challenged the WTO Panel’s finding that 
these baseline establishment provisions are not justified under 
Article XX.162
The Appellate Body found these baseline provisions failed 
to meet the prerequisites of the chapeau of Article XX.163 It 
found that the existence of more than one less discriminatory 
alternative to the baseline determination provisions, such as 
imposing the statutory baseline to both domestic and imported 
gasoline.164 The U.S. EPA argued that differentiated treatment 
between domestic and foreign refiners was warranted because 
verifying and enforcing individual baselines on foreign refin-
ers would be administratively difficult.165 The Appellate Body, 
however, agreed with the Panel’s finding that the U.S. failed 
to provide sufficient justification for denying foreign refiners 
individual baselines given the “reasonably available” means 
to verify and assess data relating to imported goods.166 The 
Appellate Body suggested that the United States should have 
initiated negotiation with Venezuela and Brazil to resolve the 
administrative problems in applying individual baselines on for-
eign refiners, although reaching an agreement is not required.167 
In addition, the Appellate Body noted that the United States 
considered compliance costs for domestic refiners, yet did not 
consider the same for foreign refiners.168 Based on these omis-
sions, the Appellate Body found the discriminatory effect of the 
baseline establishment provisions was not “merely inadvertent 
or unavoidable.”169
The rigidity and inflexibility in the application of the regula-
tion at issue across different affected countries also contributes to 
the finding of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”170 This 
finding was also the case in United States–Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.171 A group of Asian 
developing countries, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, suc-
cessfully challenged a U.S. regulation to protect sea turtles as 
constituting arbitrary discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail.172 The regulation at issue required 
all U.S. shrimp trawl vessels to use Turtle Excluder Devices 
(TEDs) or tow-time restrictions in certain specified areas.173 It 
also imposed a world-wide import ban, starting on May 1, 1996, 
on imported shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technol-
ogy which adversely affects sea turtles unless (i) the harvesting 
nation is certified by the United States to have a program regu-
lating the incidental taking of sea turtles in shrimp harvesting 
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that is comparable to that of the United States, and the average 
rate of incidental taking by the vessels of the shrimp exporting 
country is comparable to that by U.S. vessels; or (ii) the fish-
ing environment of the shrimp exporting country does not pose 
a threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of 
shrimp harvesting.174
The Appellate Body found the regulation to be rigid and 
inflexible and that it constituted “unjustifiable and arbitrary 
discrimination” for three main reasons.175 First, in practice, in 
determining the comparability of regulatory programs, U.S. gov-
ernment officials relied only on whether the exporting country’s 
regulatory program requires the use of TEDs.176 Considering 
both the language of the regulation and the practice in apply-
ing the regulation, the Appellate Body found the regulation was 
coercive in that it required other shrimp exporting countries to 
adopt regulations that are “essentially the same” as that appli-
cable to U.S. vessels, without considering whether such regula-
tions would be appropriate for those countries.177 Second, only 
exporting countries, not individual vessels, could be certified. 
As such, shrimp caught using methods identical to those used 
in the United States had been banned from U.S. market only 
because they were caught in waters of countries that had not 
been certified by the United States.178 Third, the effective date 
of the import ban did not take into account the fact that different 
exporting countries would require different phase-in periods to 
develop or obtain transfer of the required TED technology.179
The Panel and Appellate decisions in United States–Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products and the 
subsequent United States — Shrimp: Implementation Phase fur-
ther clarify the requirement of seeking cooperative agreements 
through negotiations before imposing trade restrictions. The 
United States did negotiate the Inter-American Convention for 
the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles and concluded 
the Convention in September 1996.180 However, the United 
States only proposed to negotiate similar agreements with other 
affected exporting nations after concluding the Inter-American 
Convention, and therefore after the effective date of the import 
ban (i.e., May 1, 1996).181 The Appellate Body found the United 
State’s failure to negotiate with all affected trading partners such 
as the group of Asian countries in this case was unjustifiable 
discrimination.182
To address the Appellate Body’s finding on the issue of 
failure to seek cooperative agreements with trading partners, 
the United States subsequently engaged in negotiations at a 
“sustained pace” with countries in the Indian Ocean region.183 It 
also sought to meet the policy objective of protecting sea turtles 
through the mechanisms under other international treaties, such 
as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora.184 Both the Panel and the Appellate 
Body in United States — Shrimp: Implementation Phase found 
the United States had fulfilled its obligation to negotiate and that 
concluding an agreement is not a condition of avoiding a finding 
of “unjustifiable discrimination.”185
2.3.2 Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions
Exceptions under Article XX(b) and (g) are likely to be 
of particular relevance to the design of climate related policy 
instruments. Under Article XX(b) regulatory actions that would 
otherwise violate the GATT non-discrimination principle can 
be justified if they are “necessary to protect human, animal or 
planet life or health” (emphasis added),186 provided that such 
actions are not arbitrary or an unjustifiable discrimination or dis-
guised restriction on trade, as stipulated in the chapeau of Article 
XX. Finding the regulatory action as “necessary” requires a 
showing that there are no “reasonably available” measures that 
are “consistent or less inconsistent with” the GATT.187
Article XX(g) provides that the regulations that would 
otherwise violate the GATT non-discrimination principle 
would be justified if they are “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effec-
tive in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption” (emphasis added) and meeting the requirements 
stipulated in the chapeau of Article XX.188 To be considered as 
“relating to” conservation, the regulation must be “primarily 
aimed at” the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. 
However, the regulation does not need to be essential for the 
conservation is not required.189 The term “exhaustible natural 
resources” has been held to include both non-living and liv-
ing natural resources.190 In defining the scope of “exhaustible 
natural resources,” the Appellate Body may but does not have to 
draw on other treaties.191 The Appellate Body in the EC–Biotech 
case clarifies that these treaties are relevant in interpreting the 
trade agreement not necessarily because they are legal rules,192 
but because they provide “evidence of the ordinary meaning of 
terms” of GATT (or other WTO agreements).193
Critical to the analysis of measures that may aid in imple-
menting Paris Agreement obligations is that clean air has been 
recognized as an “exhaustible natural resource” within the 
meaning of Article XX(g).194 In holding so in United States–
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the 
Panel relied on the ordinary meaning of the term “exhaustible 
natural resources” without referring to other environmental 
treaties.195 Further, the Panel found clean air is exhaustible even 
though it is renewable.196 The fact that at least at this moment, 
the international community and all of its major GHG emitting 
countries, have recognized in the Paris Agreement the “need 
for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of 
climate change,”197 can only serve to fortify the Panel’s reason-
ing that measures to protect the atmosphere merit the protection 
afforded under Article XX.
3. caSeS unDer the aGreement on technical 
barrierS to traDe
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinaf-
ter “TBT Agreement”) authorizes “technical regulations” that 
restrict trade so long as they do not create “unnecessary obsta-
cles to international trade” and are not “more trade-restrictive 
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective” such as “protec-
tion of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, 
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or the environment.”198 The standard of determining whether a 
measure is “necessary” is similar to that in finding GATT Article 
XX exceptions,199 which considers the existence of less restric-
tive measures, and the effectiveness of the measure at issue in 
relation to the policy objective pursued.200
Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement defines a “technical regu-
lation” as a document that specifies “product characteristics 
or their related processes and production methods, including 
the applicable administrative provisions, in which compliance 
is mandatory,” or requirements on “terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labeling . . . as they apply to a product, 
process or production method.”201 The issue that is likely to be 
contested is whether a specification on a product’s production 
process constitutes a valid “technical regulation” under the TBT 
Agreement. A challenge under the TBT is most likely to arise if 
there is question whether a process-based specification is made 
strictly in relation to a product’s characteristics. If the process-
based specification is indeed applicable to product’s physical 
characteristics, it can be considered as within the “applicable 
administrative provisions” under Annex 1 and therefore within 
the ambit of TBT Agreement.202
In European Communities–Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, the European 
Union imposed a Seal Regime, which provides that “any person 
wishing to import and/or place seal products . . . must have such 
products certified by a recognized body . . . [and] the products 
must be accompanied by an attesting document . . . indicat[ing] 
whether the products result from hunts conducted by Inuit or 
other indigenous communities, or from hunts for the sustain-
able management of marine resources.”203 The WTO Appellate 
Body held that these requirements do not prescribe or impose 
any characteristics on the products themselves, but only estab-
lish the criteria on the identity of the hunter and the type of the 
hunt.204 Therefore, these provisions of the Seal Regime are not 
a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the 
TBT Agreement.
As discussed earlier, a labeling system for appliances is 
one of the specifically proposed mitigation measures in INDCs. 
Labeling requirements indicating energy efficiency, which is one 
type of physical characteristic of a product, have been adopted 
in many countries.205 However, our research has not identified 
any country that has imposed a mandatory labeling require-
ment to indicate GHG emissions during the production process 
of the product.206 One could envision exporters challenging 
such a requirement as a TBT violation by alleging that such a 
requirement is not an inherent element of the final product, and 
thereby not a physical characteristic of the product. However, 
given that the international community has agreed that GHGs 
must be reduced, it seems easier to contend that products that are 
responsible for emitting more GHGs than other products are, in 
fact, not “like products”. For example, one could contend that 
if GHG output during production were irrelevant, there would 
be no need for a global agreement to reduce GHGs. Of course, 
imposition of such a requirement would still need to satisfy the 
transparency and fairness principles set forth above.
Iv. conclusIon
The Paris Agreement is the first global agreement in which 
both developed and developing countries are obligated to under-
take actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change impacts. 
Harmonious with this aspiration, trade agreements and their 
case law explicitly recognize the right of states to impose envi-
ronmental restrictions on trade to conserve clean air and protect 
public health. Nevertheless, the substantive requirements in 
trade agreements may, in some instances, limit the forms and 
means of implementation of climate-related regulations.207 
Based on the review of the case law under NAFTA, GATT, 
and the TBT Agreement, there are a few general principles that 
countries should follow in pursuing regulatory actions to reduce 
GHG emissions.
When countries move forward with a potentially diverse 
array of regulatory and policy instruments to implement the Paris 
Agreement, they will need to remain cognizant of the longstand-
ing trade regime principles that seek to ensure transparency and 
fairness. The purpose of these due process and fairness require-
ments is to ensure that investors and trading partners operate in a 
stable legal and business environment. Generally, the regulatory 
process should be protective of investors’ expectations in reli-
ance on previous commitments or representation made by the 
government; afford investors opportunities to participate and be 
heard in the administrative or regulation making process; and 
be within the legal mandate afforded by domestic law and/or 
applicable international treaties.
Trade agreements generally do not allow differentiated 
treatment of like products based solely on the products’ coun-
tries of origin, with exceptions.208 Regulating governments need 
to pay particular attention to two aspects of this general principle 
when contemplating climate-related regulations that could, for 
instance, incentivize the reduction of GHG emissions in manu-
facturing and industrial processes. First, the “likeness” deter-
mination among products should be generally based on their 
physical characteristics and usage. Further, consumer preference 
toward the products at issue could be a relevant factor in deter-
mining “likeness,” at least under the GATT case law. As such, if 
the public attaches more value to the environmental cost when 
purchasing products, there is likely to be a stronger argument 
that GHG emission in the products’ lifecycle is a differentiating 
factor among these products. In this light, it is important to rec-
ognize the potential evolution of the concept of “like products” 
given countries’ commitment to achieve the global GHG emis-
sion reduction target in the Paris Agreement.
Second, differentiated treatment among like products does 
not necessarily implicate discrimination and/or trade protection-
ism. The potential violation of the non-discrimination principle 
of major trade agreements is likely to arise when the primary 
basis for differentiated treatment is the products’ countries 
of origin.209 For example, an importing country may wish to 
design different treatment of certain imported products based 
on the GHG emissions in the exporter’s production process. The 
importing country might find defending such differentiation 
challenging if it cannot account for the GHG emissions from 
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the production process of the imported products due to a lack of 
data and administrative difficulties in accounting and monitor-
ing. A solution to deal with this deficit could be to invest in an 
equivalent assessment of the relevant GHG related regulations 
on a country-to-country basis, and to reflect such country-
based assessment in the level of differentiated treatment among 
imported like products. However, unless done in convincing and 
rigorous fashion, pursuing this approach could run afoul of the 
non-discrimination principle in trade agreements.
It is important to note that both the NAFTA and GATT pro-
vide important exceptions, under which countries could poten-
tially justify such GHG trade measures to protect public health 
and the clean air as an exhaustible natural resource. However, in 
doing so, the enacting country may be required to:
• engage in meaningful negotiation with affected foreign 
countries in an effort to harmonize their environmental 
policies and resolve the administrative difficulties in design-
ing and enforcing the contemplated regulation on foreign 
entities;
• pursue/consider and rule out less restrictive alternatives;
• ensure that the same considerations are given to all regu-
lated entities, domestic and foreign ones, in designing the 
regulation; and 
• consider building in the regulation some level of flexibility 
when the regulatory conditions and capacity of trading part-
ners with regard to the issue at hand are highly different.210
Moreover, these requirements on the enacting country could 
require a lengthy and costly rule-making process. This process 
might delay the adoption of some of the policy instruments 
declared in the INDCs and NDCs. Additionally, countries may 
not necessarily be able to avoid going through such extensive 
negotiation and rule-making process by embedding the GHG-
related requirement in a government program, implemented 
through contracts between the government and participating 
foreign investors.211 The mere fact that such a requirement is 
imposed on participating investors as a condition of domestic 
investment as opposed to the traditional command-and-control 
schemes does not necessarily eliminate the restrictive nature of 
such government requirement, especially when the requirement 
is a nonnegotiable precondition for investment approval.212 A 
recent GATT case seems to have expanded the reach of trade 
agreements to this type of regulatory programs implemented on 
a contractual basis. 213
In sum, the Paris Agreement itself does not directly modify 
the interface between trade agreements and international 
environmental agreements. However, we anticipate new devel-
opments in the case law to further delineate such interface as 
Parties to the Paris Agreement enact requirements to pursue 
national commitments and address the urgent global threat of 
climate change proclaimed by almost 200 countries. While cases 
adjudicated under major trade agreements have provided a foun-
dation for justifying trade restrictions driven by these climate-
related considerations, countries should still remain cognizant of 
the need for fairness, transparency, and proactive engagement 
when pursuing GHG emission reduction targets that potentially 
affect trade. 
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